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ABSTRACT 
 
Competitor-oriented objectives, such as market-share targets, are promoted by 
academics and are commonly used by firms. A 1996 review of the evidence, 
summarized in this paper, found that competitor-oriented objectives reduced 
profitability. We describe new evidence from 12 studies, one of which is introduced in 
this paper. The new evidence supports the conclusion that competitor-oriented 
objectives are harmful, especially when managers receive information about 
competitors’ market shares. The evidence appears to have had little effect on managers’ 
decisions and on what is taught in business schools. 
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I.         INTRODUCTION 
 
Many managers have a natural inclination to want to beat their competitors. Our 
concern in this paper is with the relationship between competitor orientation and 
performance. We show that competitor-oriented objectives are detrimental to firms’ 
profitability and that the use of information and decision aids to support such an 
orientation exacerbates the harm. 
The pursuit of competitor-oriented objectives is consistent with the long-held 
belief that business is like warfare. In the late 19th century, it was popular for executives 
to strive for revenue maximization. To see how well they were doing, they compared 
themselves to their competitors in the industry. Judging from Lanzillotti (1958), 
competitor-oriented objectives, typically expressed in terms of market share, were 
commonly utilized by large firms well before the 1950s. Oxenfeldt (1959) lamented the 
common use of market-share objectives and discussed the logical and practical flaws of 
pursuing such objectives.   
Economists frown on competitor-oriented objectives (Mueller 1992). They 
consider the proper objective of business to be profits, not market share. Business 
school academics, however, have rushed to support market share objectives, noting that 
higher market shares are correlated with higher profitability. Influential support came 
from two Harvard Business Review papers: Buzzell, Gale, and Sultan (1975) and Porter 
(1979). Other articles and books, such as Porter (1980), agreed with these claims. These 
writings gave credence to the already popular view that business is like war and that the 
goal is to win by defeating competitors. Porter (1979) went further by referring to 
customers and suppliers as competitors.  Henderson, founder of Boston Consulting 
Group, claimed, in a 1989 Harvard Business Review article, that it is all about 
survival:  “ … Darwin is probably a better guide to business competition than 
economists are.”  
Market share is positively correlated to profits. A meta-analysis of the 
relationship between market share and profitability by Szymanski et al. (1993) 
identified 48 studies that reported 276 elasticities from econometric models. The 
elasticities ranged from -0.16 to 0.84 with the unweighted mean elasticity equal to 0.20. 
However, it does not follow logically that seeking higher market share will improve 
profits. Rather the correlation between market share and profitability is more logically 
interpreted as showing that firms with better offerings tend to achieve higher market 
shares.  
Advocates of competitor-oriented objectives do not provide evidence relevant to 
their claims. However, much evidence has been published that shows such objectives 
are common,
 
II.          EVIDENCE UP THROUGH 1996 
 
Much of the evidence on the prevalence and effect of competitor orientation was 
presented in Armstrong and Collopy (1996). We briefly summarize that evidence here. 
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A. Prevalence of Market-oriented Objectives 
 
Armstrong and Collopy (1996) (henceforth A&C) summarized laboratory studies on the 
prevalence of competitor-oriented objectives. Here are some of the key studies:  
Scodel et al. (1959), Messick and Thorngate (1967), and Messick and McClintock 
(1968) modified a prisoner’s dilemma matrix to test the effect of providing information 
to subjects on their cumulative score relative to the other player’s. When playing the 
game for many trials and given feedback about their relative score, almost 90% of these 
subjects’ choices were competitive (low-profit) rather than cooperative (profit 
maximizing). Kuhlman and Marshello (1975) summarized research from three similar 
studies. The percentage of people that selected competitor-oriented responses ranged 
from 21% to 49%, depending on game instructions and payoffs. Liebrand and van Run 
(l985) found similar results across cultures.  
Between 1989 and 1994, A&C asked 170 MBA students whether “the primary 
purpose of the firm is (a) to do better than its competitors, or (b) to do the best that it 
can.” One-third of the students believed that firms should try to do better than their 
competitors. About the same percentage agreed with the statement that “the best way to 
judge the success of a firm is by how well it does relative to its competitors.” In early 
1995, the same questions were asked of 54 students at a university in Korea; about 40% 
agreed with each statement.  
Many managers justify their competitor-oriented objectives as a way to increase 
long-term profits. In l992, A&C asked marketing faculty and students: “What do you 
believe would be the effects on long-term profitability if a firm has as its primary goal 
to achieve higher market share?” Of the l02 respondents, 57% believed that profits 
would be higher, 27% believed that they would be lower, and l6% were undecided.  
In 1993, A&C surveyed 72 managers attending seminars in the US, Argentina and 
Chile. Half of them considered that “the primary purpose of our firm is to be better than 
its competitors” and 39% agreed that “the best way to judge the success of our firm is 
by how well it does relative to our competitors.”  
In the A&C survey of 21 senior executives from Japanese companies, 29% said 
that the primary purpose of their firms is to be better than their competitors, and 48% 
judged their success by how well they do relative to their competitors.  
To further assess what marketing experts believed, A&C (1996) posed the 
following question to convenience samples of marketing faculty and managers in New 
Zealand, the United States, and Argentina:  
What if we ran the following study: (l) select 20 firms from different 
industries; (2) assess the extent to which their goals are competitor 
oriented (market share); and (3) examine their profits over the next 
three decades. Assuming that the 20 firms would differ greatly with 
respect to competitor orientation, what would you predict?  
Of the 108 respondents, 52% said that profits for firms with competitor-oriented goals 
would be higher or much higher than other firms, while only 26% thought they would 
be lower or much lower.    
Leeflang and Wittink (1996), in a study of seven popular brands of a nondurable, 
nonfood product sold in the Netherlands concluded that managers overreacted to each 
other’s promotional activities. In a replication in New Zealand of the Leeflang and 
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Wittink study, Brodie, Bonfrer and Cutler (1996) found even stronger evidence that 
managers were too competitor oriented. 
 
B.         Effects of Competitor-oriented Objectives 
 
Kohn’s (1986) review of competition contains 388 references drawn from a variety of 
areas including sports, education, and the performing arts (but not from business). He 
concluded that, in general, competitor-oriented objectives harm performance.  In the 
rest of this section, we review studies related to business. 
 
1. Laboratory Studies 
 
In general, managerial objectives affect the performance of a firm (Keil et al. 2001, 
Locke and Latham 2002). A&C described prior evidence on the effects of competitor-
oriented objectives on performance:  
In Deutsch’s (1958, 1960) laboratory experiments subjects, who were acting as 
managers for two hypothetical trucking companies, had to share a road. Both 
companies were less profitable when they were told to do better than their opponents 
than when told do the best they could for themselves.  
Corfman and Lehmann (1994) asked 57 subjects to make “advertising spending 
decisions as marketing managers of a medium-sized manufacturer selling in mature 
markets.” The advertising decision involved high (competitive) or low (cooperative) 
budgets. Although the profits were much higher for the cooperative budget, 78% of the 
subjects chose the competitive budget. 
A&C conducted laboratory experiments where subjects were asked to assume the 
role of a marketing manager for their firm. Subjects in the control group were given 
information only on their own firm’s profits while the subjects in the experimental 
groups were also given information on their competitor’s profits. The situation was 
described to them, and they were told to choose a “high” or “low” price for a new 
product. Their expected profit figures were the same in each treatment and are 
explained in Table 1.  
Table 1 
Information Expected Profits Over 5 Years Group 
Provided Low Price High Price 
Control* Subject Firm $40 M $80 M 
Harm** Subject Firm Other Firm 
$40 M 
- $100 M 
$80 M 
$40 M 
Beat*** Subject Firm Other Firm 
$40 M 
$20 M 
$80 M 
$160 M 
*The control treatment made no mention of competitors. 
**Subjects were able to harm their competitors. 
***Subjects were able to do better than their competitors without causing the competitor to lose money. 
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When no information was provided about the performance of competitors, 14% of 
subjects chose the less profitable decision. Subjects in the harm treatment chose the less 
profitable decision at more than twice that rate (34%) and in the beat treatment as many 
as 60% of subjects selected the low price.  
In some versions, A&C described the situation as involving a “new, highly 
technical product” to assess whether the type of product made a difference. Variations 
in the product description did not change the results. A&C also tested other threats to 
validity by changing key aspects of the problem, as follows: 
 
a.     Longer Time Horizon.  
 
With a 5-year time horizon, some subjects in the harm and beat treatments who decided 
on the low price might have believed their firm would suffer short-term losses in 
exchange for long-term gains. To address this possibility, A&C tested a 20-year time 
horizon. This had only modest effects on the decisions. Many subjects continued to 
harm and beat subjects despite the substantial forgone profits.  
 
b. Ex Post Pricing Decision.  
 
Despite the instructions, subjects might have made different assumptions about profits 
beyond the stated planning horizon. To control for this, the problem was changed to 
refer to the past. A&C asked subjects to decide which of two divisional brand managers 
should be promoted: one who had used a high-price strategy which resulted in high 
profits, or another whose low-price strategy had led to low profits. In one treatment the 
profit figures were identical to those used in the original harm treatment, and 40% of 
subjects promoted the low-profit marketing manager. In the ex post beat treatment, 51% 
promoted the low-profit marketing manager.  
 
c. Equalizing Final Market Values. 
 
In a further version of the ex post pricing treatments, A&C added information that the 
two divisions were valued equally (both initially and currently), but the manager who 
used the higher price achieved much higher profits during the elapsing period. Among 
subjects receiving the equal–market-value harm treatment, 52% promoted the manager 
who had the lower profits while 34% did so in the equal-market-value beat treatment.  
 
d. Summarizing Across Treatments 
 
Table 2 summarizes the findings for the above treatments: 
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Table 2 
Percentage of subjects who selected the less profitable decision (number of subjects) 
Information about competitors 
Treatment None Harm Beat 
Pricing:  
   5 years (benchmark) 14 (65) 34 (139) 60 (60) 
   20 years 12 (42) 45 (40) 30 (40) 
 
Ex Post Pricing: 
 
   5 years 40 (76) 51 (69) 
   20 years 25 (24) 30 (30) 
   5 years: equal value 
n.a. 
n,a 
n.a, 52 (87) 34 (80) 
 
e. Follow-up Survey of Subjects 
 
In follow-up questionnaires, subjects were asked, “Why did you make this decision?” 
In general, once subjects took account of the competitor’s performance, they were less 
likely to pay attention to their own profits: 83% of the 107 subjects who mentioned 
competitors selected the less profitable decision.   
 
2. Field Studies 
 
Anterasian and Graham (l989) examined the performance of a sample of 42 businesses 
drawn from a Federal Trade Commission report. Their eight manufacturing industries 
had experienced a boom-bust cycle from 1974 to 1977. Those firms that sought stability 
in sales by giving up market share during the 1974 boom in their industry achieved 
higher profits during the subsequent downturn. 
A&C used the performance of American firms to determine the extent to which a 
competitor orientation can affect profitability. Information on pricing objectives of 20 
large U.S. companies had been collected by Lanzillotti (1958) and Kaplan, Dirlam, and 
Lanzillotti (1958). These sample companies were selected from among the largest 
corporations on the basis of the willingness of management to cooperate by permitting 
extensive interviews with company officials. Lanzilloti et al. conducted week-long 
interviews with company officials between 1948 and 1951 and then again between 
1956 and 1957. The companies’ objectives were the same in the follow-up interviews 
as in the initial interviews. In some firms, these objectives were based on long-standing 
policies. For example, as far back as 1937, A&P had stated that their primary aim in 
pricing was to achieve a larger market share.  
A&C inferred the competitor orientation of the firms’ objectives from 
Lanzillotti’s description of their stated pricing policies. An 11-point scale (1 = to do 
well for themselves; 11 = to do well relative to competitors) was developed to assess 
firms’ objectives. The objective of doing well for a person’s own firm was identified by 
the presence of an explicitly stated pricing goal to maximize or increase profits. At the 
other end of the scale, goals of increasing or maximizing market share were classified 
as highly competitor oriented (Table 3).   
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Table 3 
Objectives scale and number of firms at each level  
(MS = Market Share) 
Pricing objectives Competitor 
orientation Primary Secondary 
Number of firms 
1 = low High profit None stated 3 
2 Profit None stated 1 
3 Stability None stated 1 
4 High profit Maintain MS 2 
5 High profit Increase MS 0 
6 Profit Maintain MS 4 
7 Profit Increase MS 0 
8 Maintain MS Profit 2 
9 Increase MS Profit 1 
10 Maintain MS None stated 4 
11 = high Increase MS None stated 2 
 
Two raters coded firms’ orientations with a high inter-rater reliability (r = .96). The 
median firm orientation was 6. Competitor-oriented objectives were used by 30% of 
firms, and an additional 45% used a combination of profit- and competitor-oriented 
objectives.  
Lanzillotti (1958) reported average after-tax return-on-investment (ROI) data for 
nine years (1947-1955). Competitor-oriented objectives were negatively correlated with 
ROI for these data (Spearman correlation was -.43). Because many other factors also 
influence a firm’s ROI, these results suggested a strong relationship. A&C also 
analyzed the nine-year periods before and after this. Table 4 shows the ROI for each 
firm for 1938 to 1982. The Spearman correlation between competitor-orientation and 
ROI was negative for each nine-year period. A&C also found that all four companies 
whose only goal was profit (those coded as 1 or 2 in Tables 3 and 4) survived. This 
compares with the failure of four of the six companies whose only goal was market 
share (those coded as 10 or 11 in Tables 3 & 4) 
 
III.         REACTIONS TO EVIDENCE 
 
Despite some mass media coverage (e.g., Wall Street Journal) in the U.S., New 
Zealand, and Argentina, the initial response by managers to the A&C paper was apathy. 
A&C also encountered resistance from the academic community. 
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Table 4 
Competitor orientation of firms and ROI for nine-year periods 
 Competitor 
orientation 
ROI (After Taxes) 
Firm 1=low 
11= high
1938-1946 1947-1955 1956-1964 1965-1973 1974-1982
DuPont 1 9.1 15.4 15.5 8.0 6.9 
General Electric 1 8.1 10.9 9.4 6.7 7.9 
Union Carbide 1 9.8 11.0 9.1 6.3 6.6 
Alcoa 2 8.5 6.4 4.2 4.2 5.5 
Kennecott 3 8.6 13.3 8.9 8.2 3.2 
General Motors 4 8.8 16.6 13.2 12.0 6.3 
Johns Manville 4 6.8 11.2 4.6 7.6 4.9 
Standard Oil New 
Jersey (Exxon ) 6 5.4 13.0 7.8 7.6 8.0 
General Foods 6 11.9 8.2 11.4 8.9 7.4 
US Steel (USX ) 6 3.4 6.5 6.0 3.5 3.4 
International Harvester 6 4.7 6.7 4.6 4.0 -3.4 
Kroger 8 7.2 8.0 6.1 4.9 4.6 
Standard Oil of 
Indiana  8 5.3 7.1 5.4 6.4 8.3 
Sears 9 8.8 12.4 8.5 6.4 4.2 
Goodyear 10 5.8 6.4 7.0 5.7 4.0 
Gulf  10 5.0 9.7 8.9 7.1 6.3 
American Can  10 6.8 7.8 5.2 4.8 3.8 
Swift 10 3.9 4.6 2.4 3.3 n.a. 
Great Atlantic & 
Pacific 11 6.8 8.4 7.8 4.2 -2.9 
National Steel 11 5.2 9.6 6.0 5.1 1.1
Spearman correlation with 
competitor orientation -.54 -.43 -.37 -.43 -.45 
 
 
At a talk in 1992, the first author asked twenty-three academics whether empirical 
evidence would affect their opinions about the use of market share as an objective: 35% 
said it would not. The first author has also challenged colleagues to provide evidence 
favoring the use of market share as an objective; they replied only with examples, such 
as “What about General Electric?” While the use of anecdotes is a weak form of 
argument, even the GE story is suspect: GE’s ROI was lower in the decade after it 
espoused a goal of market share than it was in the preceding decade (cf. appendix of 
Franke et al. 2006 in this special issue).  
A&C obtained prior peer review from other researchers—28 of whom provided 
useful suggestions. In addition, seven editorial assistants worked on the paper. The 
formal process of journal submission began in 1989 and continued through 1995. The 
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paper went through reviews initially at the Journal of Marketing then at the Journal of 
Marketing Research. This involved four editors and about ten reviewers over the six-
year period.  
Reviewers raised alternative explanations for the findings from A&C’s 
laboratory experiments. For example, one reviewer stated: “… the fact that people 
selected the low price did not surprise me. The logic would be that hirting competition 
would force them out yielding higher returns in the future.” [They undoubtedly meant 
“hurting competitors” instead of “hirting competition” yet the sentence shows the 
sloppy effort that went into many of the reviews.] A&C ran additional experiments to 
test the reviewers’ proposed explanations. When the results refuted their objections, the 
reviewers found other explanations. Eventually, the authors and collaborators ran 23 
treatments in 43 administrations using 1,016 subjects over a nine-year period. Given the 
failure to find support for alternative explanations, some reviewers then stated that 
laboratory experiments were not convincing to them. This led A&C to analyze the field 
data.  
The field study also proved unconvincing to reviewers. One reviewer stated: “the 
nature of competition has changed substantially and what worked then would not work 
now.”  
One reviewer wrote that the paper lacked “a theoretical explanation of the 
findings.” This reviewer proceeded to use game theory to explain why there is no 
“theory of profit maximization.” The reviewer found the shortcomings in theory to be 
so serious he wrote that “…I am hard pressed to specify a particular direction [to] 
address this shortcoming.” In general, the stronger our evidence became, the harsher the 
reviewers’ reports. 
Extensive evidence on peer review shows that papers with findings that 
contradict important viewpoints are nearly always rejected by reviewers (Armstrong 
1997). For example, a survey by Armstrong and Hubbard (1991) found that: “Editors of 
16 psychology journals reported that reviewers dealt harshly with papers that contained 
controversial findings”. The first author found that none of what he considers his 
twenty most important papers received full acceptance by reviewers; fortunately, 
editors stepped in to over-rule the reviewers. A&C fitted that pattern, and this paper 
was an invited submission.  
 
IV. EVIDENCE SINCE THE 1996 REVIEW 
 
We searched for evidence in the decade since 1996. Our search procedures are 
described in an appendix to this article. We looked for evidence on the prevalence of 
competitor-oriented objectives and on their impact on performance. 
 
A. Laboratory Studies 
 
Griffith and Rust (1997) compared the performance of subjects (MBA students) with 
that of computerized normative pricing strategies in a version of a prisoner’s dilemma 
game. Each game involved three players. The subjects were unaware that in two out of 
three games the “third player” was a computer. The game was designed to represent the 
market for mature, frequently purchased consumer-goods. It was possible for 
cooperative players to make a profit of $20 if they all charged $1.50 per unit. Subjects 
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playing the roles of managers were instructed to maximize their profits and were told 
that their compensation would be partly based on their profitability. Despite these 
instructions, subjects tended to charge close to the “envious price” of $1.36 – the price 
that maximized the gap between their own profit and that of the other subjects. When 
subjects played against other subjects, the average profit was $7.19, well below the 
potentially achievable cooperative profit of $20.   
Arnett and Hunt (2002) conducted an extension of the A&C laboratory studies. 
The subjects were 365 MBA and executive-MBA students with three or more years of 
business experience. The subjects were instructed to assume that they were the owners 
(rather than marketing managers as in A&C) of a firm and must decide the price of a 
new product. The description of the situation was similar to that of A&C except that 
four price points (rather than two) were provided. In the description provided to the 
subjects, expected profits increased as the price increased. Arnett and Hunt found that 
an even higher proportion of their subjects (56%) chose to harm their competitor and 
sacrifice profits than was the case with A&C’s subjects.  
 
B.      Field Studies  
 
Franke, Armstrong and Vaclavik (1998) analyzed additional data on the A&C twenty 
firm study. This extended through 1997, at which time there were 11 survivors. In 
addition, they introduced two new criteria: “real return on equity” and “percent of after-
tax return on sales.” Finally, they covered the 1955 through 1997 time period using ten-
year time intervals up to 1984, followed by six- and four-year intervals. All of the 
correlations between competitor-oriented objectives and profitability were negative, 
ranging from -.28 to -.73.  
Shrader (2001) studied the performance of 176 foreign market entries by 70 US 
high-technology manufacturing firms. The firms were less than seven years old at the 
time of their initial public offering (IPO) and the IPOs all occurred between 1983 and 
1988. To measure the firms’ competitor orientation, two researchers independently 
examined the firms’ IPO prospectuses and coded them on a five-point scale depending 
on whether the firm’s objective was to be a “minor player”, “industry leader” or in 
between with an inter-rater reliability of r = .81. Shrader examined two measures of 
performance: profitability and sales growth. Profitability was measured as the average 
return on sales in a single foreign market over a three-year period. In addition to 
competitor orientation, Shrader used foreign market sales growth, firm-level sales 
growth, age of the firm at foreign entry, and number of employees to estimate a 
regression model for profitability. Competitor orientation was negatively related to 
profits.  
Those advocating larger market share as a goal often profess that the added share 
will contribute to the appeal of their brand. Hellofs and Jacobson (1999) analyzed five 
years of data from surveys of consumer attitudes for 85 firms’ offerings in 28 product 
categories. On average, achieving higher market share led consumers to believe a firm’s 
offering had declined in quality. As a consequence they were prepared to pay less.  
A series of studies have been done using a competitor-orientation scale 
developed by Narver and Slater (1990 24). This scale includes the following items 1) 
salespeople “share information about competitors”, 2) respond rapidly to competitors’ 
actions, top managers 3) discuss competitors’ strategies, and 4) target opportunities for 
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competitive advantage. Only the last item relates directly to competitor-oriented 
objectives, whereas the first three items seem like reasonable strategies for all 
businesses. As a result, it was unclear whether the net effects of their competitor-
orientation scale would be positive. Although it is a confounded measure of competitor-
oriented objectives, it was negatively related to performance in three of the following 
four studies: 
 
• Hardley and Mavondo (2000) surveyed 145 retail pharmacists in Australia about 
their businesses. Profitability was measured as an aggregate of previous, current, 
and future profit. They found that competitor orientation was negatively related to 
profitability . 
 
•Lukas and Ferrell (2000) surveyed 194 manufacturing companies. The authors 
did not examine profitability, but they found companies with high competitor-
orientation scores were less likely than other firms to produce line-extensions and 
new-to-the-world products, and more likely to produce me-too products. 
 
•Matanda and Mavondo (2001), in a study of 276 horticultural retailing 
establishments in Zimbabwe, found that competitor orientation was negatively 
related to performance. 
 
•Dawes (2000), using a scale adapted from Narver and Slater’s, found a positive 
relationship between self-reported performance and competitor orientation. Like 
Narver and Slater’s, however, Dawes’s scale went beyond whether a business was 
concerned with beating an opponent. 
 
 
V.         MANAGEMENT GAMES 
 
During the reviewing process for A&C’s paper, reviewers insisted that the authors 
remove evidence reporting on a management game. A reviewer said, “I strongly 
disagree with your position on the relevance of performance in a simulation to 
performance in the ‘Real world’.” Our position is that all relevant findings should be 
reported, so we report on the previously deleted study here.  
 
A.     Previously Unpublished Study Using a Management Game 
 
Armstrong and Collopy had used a management simulation to examine industry-wide 
effects of competitor-oriented objectives. The task was part of a semester-long course 
organized around a computer simulation. Participants were divided into four identical 
industries. Each industry had five or six firms, and each firm was comprised of two to 
five students. The study had advantages over a field study in that all firms were initially 
of equal value and decision makers faced an identical market.  
Subjects made decisions about advertising, product mix, product development, 
pricing, and debt level, while competing for employees, customers, and capital. The 
goal of each firm was to maximize its stock market value by the end of year 
seven.  Market values reflect not only historical performance, but also the market’s 
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perception of how firms will do in the future. The stock of each firm was traded on an 
exchange where mergers, acquisitions, and leveraged buy-outs were possible. Each firm 
had access to financial and market data on the performance of all other firms in its 
industry.  
The fifty-one participants were enrolled in an elective management course at the 
Wharton School in spring of 1991. The participants’ effort and emotional involvement 
were high. They reported that they often discussed their team’s performance outside 
class and made bets about the final market value of the firms.  
Armstrong and Collopy designed a self-administered questionnaire to assess 
orientation. The student-managers gave their opinions on each of the following 
questions using the scale 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neither agree nor 
disagree; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree:  
1. I would try to harm my competitor, even if it did not provide my 
firm with a competitive advantage, as long as it cost my firm 
nothing.  
2. Even if my firm were somewhat harmed in the process, I would try 
to substantially harm my competitor.  
3. The best way to judge the success of a firm is by how well it does 
relative to its competitors.  
4. To be successful today, a company must be competitor oriented. It 
must look for weak points in the positions of competitors and then 
launch marketing attacks against these weak points.  
This self-administered questionnaire was given to participants two weeks before the 
end of the game.  
Responses were summarized for each of the four industries, averaging about 13 
responses per industry. The average response for managers in the least competitor-
oriented industry was 2.52, while that in the most competitor-oriented was 3.14.  Table 
5 presents average competitor orientation by industry in the next to last column.  A 
substantial portion of managers was motivated by competitor-oriented objectives.   
  
Table 5 
Competitor-oriented goals versus market value 
Number of 
firms in 
industry Subjects 
Competitor 
orientation   
(1 = low      
5 = high) 
Average 
market value 
($ million) 
6 17 2.52 33.5 
5 12 2.67 33.8 
5 9 2.89 31.6 
5 13 3.14 21.7 
 
All firms began the simulation with a market value of $15 million.  The average market 
value of firms at the end of the simulation was calculated by multiplying the number of 
shares by the share price for each firm, summing across all firms in the industry, and 
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then dividing by the number of firms (1st column of Table 5). The competitor-
orientation of managers (3rd column of Table 5) was inversely related to the market 
value of firms at the end of the simulation (last column). The scale for competitor-
orientation was crude, which reduces the power of the analysis. The effects of 
competitor orientation were strong.  
The simulation had a known time horizon of seven years. This lack of a 
continuing relationship among firms might have encouraged an excess of competitor-
oriented behavior. Since the assessment of competitor orientation was conducted late in 
the game, managers of teams that were doing poorly might have focused more on 
market share. Their poorer showing could have been due to earlier performance, rather 
than to competitor-oriented objectives; thus, poor performance might have caused a 
competitor orientation. We tested this explanation in a convenience sample of 101 
faculty members. By the margin of 55% to 22%, the experts said that they would be 
more likely to use market share as a goal when the firm was doing well than when it 
was doing poorly, thus arguing against this alternative explanation.  
Armstrong and Collopy also examined the percentages of participants in each 
industry who reported having completed at least one strategic planning course prior to 
the simulation. When they allocated the 21 firms into groups by level of strategic 
planning education, they found that less profitable decisions were made by 38% of the 
low-education, 46% of the intermediate-education, and 55% of the high-education 
groups. In effect, then, those with more management education made less profitable 
decisions.  
 
B. Other Studies Involving Management Games 
 
In simulations using executive MBA students, Abramson et al. (2005) told subjects to 
maximize their aggregate profit and that this would contribute to their course grade. 
Each of the five firms in each simulation was managed by an individual subject. While 
all firms were in the business of providing health care plans, each had different plans 
and cost structures and started with different customer profiles. Simulations were 
conducted over eight rounds with a week between each round. A model, based on an 
actual situation, was used to generate the results of each round. In simulations where 
information on competitors’ profits was provided, subjects set lower prices than in 
simulations where profit information was private. When competitors’ market-share 
figures were also made available to subjects in six further simulations, participants set 
their firms’ prices even lower than when competitor profits were provided. Abramson 
et al. concluded that “information on market share leads to lower profits.” 
Keil et al. (2001) used a business simulation to test the effect of different 
objectives. Their subjects were 54 employees of multi-national companies participating 
in a US university’s executive education program. They were given historical data on 
prices, sales, profits, and market shares for three products, one of which was to be the 
responsibility of the subject. The subjects made decisions on the price of their product 
and, after a delay, were given data on their performance. The subjects were led to 
believe that decisions for the other products were being made by anonymous 
classmates, but they were in fact being made by a software model. Subjects who were 
given a profit maximization objective earned greater profits than managers who, under 
the broad instruction to “do the best you can,” selected their own objectives. Those 
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subjects who were not instructed to maximize profit sought instead to boost their 
market share by pricing aggressively relative to competing products.  
Marks and Albers (2001) asked 240 senior marketing students to play the roles of 
managers in a management game. On their own volition, subjects were concerned with 
their performance relative to competitors and consequently made decisions that resulted 
in lower profits than would have been achieved had all subjects attempted to maximize 
their own firms’ profits. In particular, subjects chose to compete for market share by 
selling similar products rather than taking advantage of profitable opportunities to 
differentiate their products.  
 
VI  ADOPTION OF EVIDENCE-BASED FINDINGS 
 
While advocates of market-share objectives have provided no evidence to support their 
contention, their writings seem to have had an effect on the academic research. Ramos-
Rodríguez and Ruíz-Navarro (2004) identified the 50 works that have had the greatest 
impact on strategic management research by counting citations in the Strategic 
Management Journal. Porter’s (1980) competitor-oriented work was ranked first; an 
extraordinary distinction for a book that contains no evidence on this topic. With 44 
citations, Buzzell et al. (1975) was also included among the 50 most influential works 
and was the eighth most cited work from 1980 to 1986.  
Management textbooks repeat the claim that increasing market share will 
improve profitability. For example, the authors of Europe’s best-selling strategy 
textbook wrote: “Since companies with higher market share have more cumulative 
experience, it is clearly important to gain and hold market share” (Johnson and Scholes 
2002 168). The authors suggested that following their recommendation would lead to 
improved profitability: “The link between performance and relative market share, 
which is emphasized by the experience curve work, is supported by the findings of the 
PIMS database…” (p. 365). Readers were also told that “these benefits of market share 
can be even more important in global markets” (p. 370).   
 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The market share myth is likely to remain strong as long as teaching and textbooks, 
decision aides, popular books, and investors’ decisions ignore scientific evidence on the 
effects of business objectives. We make the following recommendations: 
 
A. Do Not Advocate Competitor-oriented Objectives in Classes and 
Textbooks.  
 
Economics textbooks provide valid recommendations with respect to market share. The 
notion that firms should maximize market share does not seem to be worthy of study by 
economists, as it is contrary to the theory of the firm   For example, Besanko, Dranove 
and Shanley (2000 98-100) in their textbook, Economics of Strategy, clarify early 
confusion about the relationship between market share and profitability: “The observed 
correlation between market share and profitability should not be taken to imply that any 
strategy designed to boost market share will increase a firm’s profitability … There is 
no causal mechanism whereby market share leadership automatically translates to 
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profits.”  Unfortunately, many business school professors seem to have had little 
training in economics. Marketing professors and those who teach business strategy 
continue to advise students to strive for market share and they develop techniques to 
help businesses gain market share.  
 
B. Develop Profit-oriented Decision Aids  
 
Some decision aids for managers are based on competitor-oriented objectives. For 
example, portfolio planning methods examine performance relative to competitors. 
In laboratory experiments with over one thousand subjects, Armstrong and Brodie 
(1994) found that use of the Boston Consulting Group’s portfolio planning matrix as a 
decision aid substantially reduced the profitability of subjects’ decisions. Slater and 
Zwirlein (1992) concluded from a study of 129 firms that those whose strategies are 
consistent with portfolio planning models had lower returns to shareholders. Capon, 
Farley, and Hulbert (1987 316-317) found that, on average, firms that used the Boston 
Consulting Group portfolio matrix methods reported a lower return on capital than 
those that did not use them.  
The experience curve strategy is another competitor-oriented technique. This 
strategy encourages firms to cut prices in order to increase volume and thus propel the 
firm down its cost curve faster than competitors can move down theirs. In other words, 
they should price low to prevent competitors from catching up. Lieberman (l987 451) 
concluded that the experience curve produces incentives that “often intensify 
competition and reduce profits.”  To assess the impact of exposure to the experience 
curve concept, some subjects in A&C received a description from Kiechel (1981 139-
l40) advocating its use. The decisions of those 97 subjects were compared with those 
from 137 control subjects (in the same administrations) who received no information 
about the experience curve. More experience-curve subjects selected the less profitable 
decision than did control subjects (59% versus 45%).   
 
C.      Disseminate Findings through Books  
 
Companies still pursue and business schools continue to promote competitor-oriented 
objectives. For example, in April 2005, the Wharton School invited Jack Welch to talk 
about his most recent book, Winning (Welch and Welch 2005). In the book, Welch 
reveals that he has no knowledge of the research on this issue. Moreover, he advises 
readers to follow their gut instincts and implies that research findings are harmful to 
one’s thinking.   
Rather than giving support to such views, business schools should emphasize 
evidence-based books and give evidence-based advice. For example, Kotler’s 
Marketing Management text included the BCG matrix from the 1980 edition on. 
Anterasian, et al. (1996 74) wrote “…we suggest you find the portfolio models section 
and rip those pages out.” Students are now saved that trouble: Kotler and Keller 
removed mention of the BCG matrix, and the market share-profitability correlation 
from their 2006 edition.    
Two books (Miniter 2002 and Slywotzky et al. 2001) argue against market share 
as an objective. However, as with the pro-market share publications, the authors present 
no evidence on performance. Nevertheless, both books were well-received judging 
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from the results of our November 2006 Google search for Miniter and his book title, 
The Myth of Market Share, and for Slywotzky and his, The Profit Zone. The searches 
identified 330 and 16,000 sites, respectively. Although the reviews were generally 
positive, sales are low and you can purchase either book now for less than $0.50 used. 
 
D. Encourage Improved Investment Decisions  
 
One way to gain acceptance of these findings would be to show how they might be used 
to make more profitable investments. We conducted an unpublished analysis of the 
twenty companies in Lanzillotti’s studies and found that the firms that cared most about 
profits yielded higher stock market returns than did the firms that cared most about 
market share. The sample size was small and the variance was large, so the first author 
attempted to expand the sample size by classifying firms according to their objectives. 
Unfortunately, hardly any firms reveal their objectives in annual reports, so it would be 
necessary to conduct interviewers such as those done by Lanzillotti.  
 
VIII.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Despite evidence from diverse laboratory and field studies demonstrating that 
competitor-oriented objectives harm performance, the myth of market share lives on 
among business leaders who prefer to follow their gut instincts. We expect economic 
losses to continue at least until textbooks, business school courses, decision aids, and 
investors’ decisions reflect the evidence that pursuing profit, rather than defeating 
competitors, is the proper objective of businesses.  
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IX. APPENDIX: LITERATURE SEARCH PROCEDURES 
 
In May 2005, we used the terms “market share objectives” and [“market share” and 
“profit”] in a Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) search of titles, abstracts and 
keywords in articles published between 1995 and 2005. Aside from A&C, we found no 
relevant papers. We found no articles using the term “competitor-oriented objectives.” 
Using both sets of search terms on JSTOR, we found only A&C and a review. We used 
Google Scholar to look for occurrences of the phrase “competitor-oriented objectives” 
and found none. Using the terms “market share objectives” plus “profitability” and 
“competitor orientation” with Google Scholar, we found 52 articles, of which only two 
proved to be relevant.   
An SSCI search for papers that cited A&C revealed 24 papers (excluding self-
citations) that cited A&C. Three were germane to the question of what effect 
competitor-oriented objectives have on outcomes. A JSTOR search for citations of 
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A&C did not find any additional articles. A Google Scholar search for A&C citations 
found 32 papers, of which 19 had not been found by the SSCI search; three of these 
were germane to our topic. Most authors who cited A&C accepted their findings. 
We looked for the term “market share” in Harvard Business Review, Strategic 
Management Journal, and Journal of Marketing. These searches identified 9, 12, and 
13 articles respectively. Only one was relevant.  
We identified other relevant articles from citations. Following our search, we sent 
email messages to 27 researchers who had done research on our topic asking them to 
identify recent research that we might have missed in our search for evidence. We 
received helpful responses from nine researchers, but learned of no new research that 
was relevant to this paper.   
Finally, we sent requests to email lists for additional studies. To aid in this, we 
posted a draft of our paper at http://conflictforecasting.com and requested additional 
peer review. 
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